Many physicists regard the flow of time as an illusion. There is an upper level flow of time, the phenomenon of past/present/future; and there is a lower level flow of time which is really a flow of events. Perceptual completion accounts for the lower level flow of time in a few ways: apparent movement; amodal completion; and dynamic change as exemplified by a newly described modal completion that we called happening. It acts like an illusory percept connecting discrete stimuli in (...) all sensory modalities. The past/present/future distinction cannot exist unless an object is perceived to be the same now as it is then. This cognition requires object persistence. Experiments with object persistence suggest the circumstances when that, too, is an illusory percept. The illusory percepts of object persistence and perceptual completion can account for the entire flow of time. Our findings and conclusions are congruent with a few time theories and cosmologies that suggest that the flow of time is an illusion. (shrink)

In diesem Buch setzen sich zehn Wissenschaftler und Autoren aus verschiedenen Disziplinen mit dem unfaßbaren Thema Glück auseinander. Weit davon entfernt, Glücksratgeber zu sein, hinterfragen die hier versammelten Autoren verschiedene Glücksdefinitionen: Philosophisch gesehen findet sich das Glück zum Beispiel im «guten Leben». Wer der schwierigen Frage, was ein gutes Leben sei, aus dem Weg gehen will, der sucht das Glück vielleicht lieber in konkreten Dingen, wie Geld, Sport, Drogen, Musik, Reisen oder Lesen. Neben dem individuellen Glück werden auch große, kulturelle (...) Glücksbeschaffer besprochen, denn Religion, Ideologie und Magie wollen ebenfalls das Glück herbeibringen - oder sie versprechen es zumindest. Im Licht der unterschiedlichen Methoden und Fragestellungen treffen in diesem Band verschiedene Facetten der zutiefst menschlichen Suche nach dem Glück aufeinander. Aus der Summe der Perspektiven eröffnet sich ein fragmentarisches Panorama, welches auf eindrucksvolle Weise die Größe des gesuchten Gefühles offenbart. (shrink)

Die Welt ist alles, was wir in unseren naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien beschreiben können – so eine weit verbreitete Überzeugung, die seit den Tagen des Positivismus unser Weltbild bestimmt. Aber reicht das tatsächlich schon aus? Wer sich am Ideal der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis orientiert, neigt dazu, viele nicht-begriffliche Erfahrungsformen zu unterschlagen, die uns aus dem Alltag vertraut sind: Symbolsysteme wie Musik, Literatur oder Bilder, Instanzen der unmittelbaren Erfahrung wie Anschauung, Wahrnehmung oder Gefühl und den Bereich des praktischen Könnens. In der Regel sind wir (...) nicht in der Lage, den Gehalt dieser Phänomene vollständig begrifflich wiederzugeben. Dennoch ist das weite Feld des Nichtbegrifflichen eine unverzichtbare Voraussetzung unserer Sätze und Gedanken: Ohne Kunst, Wahrnehmung und Handeln gibt es kein Denken, keine Wissenschaft, keine Philosophie. Der Band geht der Vielfalt des Nicht-Begrifflichen in ästhetischen, symboltheoretischen und semantischen Untersuchungen nach. Aus ihnen ergibt sich ein umfassender systematischer Überblick über eines der spannendsten und offensten Problemfelder der aktuellen philosophischen Debatte. Mit Beiträgen von: Andreas Bartels, Uwe Baumann, Volker Beeh, Gottfried Boehm, Olaf Breidbach, Joachim Bromand, Gottfried Gabriel, Markus Gabriel, Ernest Wolf Gazo, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, Jürgen Goldstein, Jens Halfwassen, Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Wolfgang Harms, Jochen Hörisch, Peter Janich, Guilherme F. R. Kisteumacher, Jakub Kloc-Konkolowicz, Imi Knoebel, Theo Kobusch, Klaus-M. Kodalle, Sibylle Krämer, Guido Kreis, Wolfgang Kubin, Sönke Lorenz, Antonio Cota Marçal, Aliasghar Mosleh, Theodoros Penolidis, Dominik Perler, Hans-Joachim Pieper, Andrzej Przylebski, Birgit Sandkaulen, Matthias Schmoeckel, Oswald Schwemmer, Josef Simon, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Dieter Teichert, Kai Vogeley, Gottfried Willems und Gereon Wolters. (shrink)

Streszczenie Klauzula sumienia została wprowadzona do obszaru prawnych regulacji międzynarodowych w związku z uchwałą Rady Europy o nr 1763 z dnia 7 października 2010 r. Zgodnie z treścią dokumentu istnieje przyzwolenie odstąpienia od wykonania określonego świadczenia medycznego ze względu na zastrzeżenia moralne (religijne lub światopoglądowe) zgłaszane przez przedstawicieli opieki zdrowotnej. W przepisach polskiego prawa medycznego powołanie się na zasadę klauzuli sumienia jest dozwolone, ale wyłącznie dla lekarzy, pielęgniarek i położnych. Farmaceuci są pozbawieni tej możliwości. Jednak wykonywanie niektórych czynności zawodowych budzi (...) zastrzeżenia etyczne wśród farmaceutów. Autorzy artykułu postanowili zbadać opinię farmaceutów zarówno na temat klauzuli sumienia oraz określonych regulacji prawnych, które zdaniem respondentów powinny podlegać zmianom legislacyjnym. Celem pracy jest zaprezentowanie wyników z przeprowadzonych badań, które zostały zrealizowane w 2020 r. na terenie Wielkopolskiej Okręgowej Izby Farmaceutycznej w Poznaniu. Słowa kluczowe: wolność sumienia i wyznania, klauzula sumienia, farmacja, antykoncepcja, Polska. (shrink)

Das Handbuch bildet erstmals den empirischen und theoretischen Problembestand der deutschsprachigen Europasoziologie in seinem ganzen Facettenreichtum ab, benennt und diskutiert kontroverse und offene Probleme. Angelegt als Beitrage zum europasoziologischen state of the art werden die Lemmata zu den einschlagigen Sachproblemen dabei unter den Hauptstrangen "Institutionenbildung und Institutionenpolitik", "Territoriale Restrukturierung", "Sozialstruktur und Sozialpolitik", "Transnationale Verflechtungen" und "Gesellschaftstheoretische Perspektiven" versammelt. Das Handbuch stellt die jeweils zentralen Theorieansatze und Konzepte, die relevanten empirischen Befunde sowie die wichtigsten feldspezifischen Kontroversen konzise dar und diskutiert mit (...) Umsicht das Innovationspotenzial und die kunftigen Herausforderungen. Insbesondere aufgrund des Nachschlagecharakters bietet es damit auch fur Interessierte auaerhalb der Soziologie und fur wissenschaftliche Laien einen kompetenten und aktuellen Uberblick zugleich uber den Wissensfundus und den Diskussionsstand des Faches. (shrink)

In der Bundestagsrede 2011 hat Benedikt XVI. das Schlagwort "Ökologie des Menschen" in Verbindung mit dem Naturrecht gebracht. Letzteres steht für die Integration des Menschlichen und wird aktuell, wo der Mensch über sich selbst verfügen will. Die Zeit des Naturrechts als System ist vorbei, unabweisbar aber bleibt die Frage nach Leben und Sein des Menschen "im Recht". So wird z. B. bei biomedizinischen Eingriffen in das menschliche Genom die Frage nach der künftigen Identität der Menschennatur gestellt. Kein anderer Philosoph hat (...) den konstitutiven Zielbezug des Naturrechts auf die Person des Menschen als allem Denken vorausliegendes Sein so deutlich herausgearbeitet wie Robert Spaemann. Die Erschließung der Entsprechung von Sein und Sollen, wie sie in jeder Person schon präsent ist, und die Umsetzung in eine grenzbewusste Ethik sind entscheidende Anstöße zur Erneuerung naturrechtlichen Denkens. The old philosophical notion of "natural law" becomes relevant again, notedly concerning attempts taking possession of "humanum". Although the natural law cannot be seen as a system of rules, it fits to the necessity of generally binding coordinates. The present work shows how the opus of the philosopher R. Spaemann aids to renew the natural-law-thinking based on teleology and ontology of person. (shrink)

Several commentators, among them R. Rorty, argue that Cartesian ideas are to be understood as internal objects or pictures that are presented to the mind on an 'inner arena'. In this paper I intend to show that such an interpretation is flawed if one takes into account Descartes' definition of ideas as mental a c t s having a representational content. I analyze this definition, paying particular attention to three crucial theses: intentionality is an intrinsic feature of all mental acts; (...) mental acts primarily represent the essence of an object, not the existing object; the object, insofar as it is presented to the mind, determines the socalled Objective reality' of an idea. I reach the conclusion that one ought to be careful in attributing a representational theory to Descartes. His theory may be called representational only if it is understood as a theory about representing mental acts that are immediately directed towards external objects. (shrink)

Gemäß einer weit verbreiteten These, die besonders durch die Arbeiten von R. Popkin prominent wurde, ist der frühneuzeitliche Skeptizismus auf die Wiederentdeckung des antiken Pyrrhonismus zurückzuführen. Gegen diese These wird im vorliegenden Aufsatz argumentiert, dass Descartes’ Außenwelt-Skeptizismus keine pyrrhonische Struktur aufweist. Er beruht vielmehr auf einem Internalismus, der sich nicht in antiken Quellen findet. Die Entstehung dieses Internalismus wird zum einen in historischer Hinsicht untersucht. Anhand der Analyse spätmittelalterlicher Texte wird gezeigt, wie die Annahme von „species intelligibiles“ dazu führte, dass (...) innere Objekte eingeführt wurden, die nur in einer kontingenten Relation zu äußeren Gegenständen stehen. Zum anderen wird in systematischer Hinsicht geprüft, inwiefern der Außenwelt-Skeptizismus aufgrund der internalistischen Annahmen das Produkt einer bestimmten Theorie des Geistes ist und somit nicht als ein „natürlicher Zweifel“ bezeichnet werden kann. (shrink)

About: the tensions between the inner and outer view of R-languages ("real languages"), the language-centered and theory-centered study of languages, the (often foreign) linguist and the (sometimes linguist) native speaker, description and theory, a language as a set of choices and extensions of universal grammar and as a concrete realization in a particular culture and history. The materials for this paper are drawn mostly from First Nations languages, especially those of the Pacific Northwest.

Im zweiten Buch seiner rechtstheologischen Summe De legibus ac Deo legislatore aus dem Jahre 1612 entwickelt Francisco Suárez seine Theorie des Naturrechts. Dabei gelingt Suárez die kritische Überarbeitung der lex-naturalis-Theorien des Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin und damit eine kritische Kontinuität mittelalterlicher Rechtstheologie. Suárez formuliert aber darüber hinaus eine für das frühe 17. Jahrhundert eigenständige Konzeption, die als innovatives Modell von Naturrecht mit den Entwürfen Hugo Grotius’ und Thomas Hobbes’ zu konkurrieren vermag. Die Einflüsse dieses genuin politisch-theologischen Naturrechtskonzepts reichen bis (...) zu Pufendorf und Wolff. Der Band erschließt diesen Schlüsseltext des frühneuzeitlichen Naturrechts im Sinne eine kooperativen Kommentars. Mit Beiträgen von Oliver Bach, Nobert Brieskorn, Simon Eultgen, Holger Glinka, Frank Grunert, Dominik Recknagel, Stefan Schweighöfer, Kurt Seelmann und Gideon Stiening. (shrink)

Professor Robertson sketches an elegant framework for policy evaluation and regulation of the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis for various medical, medical related, and non-medical purposes. In criticism of his position, I argue that the distinction between policy and ethics upon which his argument relies is highly unstable, and the approach taken to ethical evaluation of particular parental interests leaves open many issues which the policy approach would hope to exclude. In conclusion I argue that while his position ultimately fails, (...) the onus is on his critics to come up with a viable and satisfying alternative. (shrink)

Our gender identity is our sense of ourselves as a woman, a man, as genderqueer, or as another gender. Our gender is the property we have of being a woman, being a man, being non-binary, or being another gender. What is the relationship between our gender identity and our gender? Recently, much work has been done on ameliorative accounts of the gender concepts that we should accept and on the metaphysics of gender properties. From this work 4 views of the (...) relationship between having gender identity G (e.g. having a female gender identity) and being a gender G (e.g. being a woman) have emerged. A first, the no connection view, says that gender identity and gender are entirely distinct; Sally Haslanger’s ameliorative account of gender, as well as Theodore Bach’s account of gender properties, are instances of this view. A second, the gender-identity-first view, says that all there is to our gender is our gender identity; this view is at least similar to views that Talia Bettcher and R.A. Briggs and B.R. George have argued for. A third, contextualist view, says that in some contexts and relative to certain standards, our gender identity determines our gender, and that in others it does not; Ásta and Robin Dembroff have proposed and defended views along these lines. A fourth view, the two gender properties view, says that there are two properties that can make it the case that one is gender G (in any context), one’s having gender identity G and one’s being socially classed as a G; Katharine Jenkins and Elizabeth Barnes have proposed views along these lines. This article explains these 4 different views and spells out their prospects, and the problems they face, as both ameliorative and as metaphysical views. (shrink)

Mimesis and the portrayal of reflective life in action : Aristotle's Poetics and Sophocles' Oedipus the King -- The portrayal of reflective life in action in poetry : Shakespeare's dramatization of the poet in Sonnets 1-126 -- The portrayal of reflective life in action in music : Bach's Prelude and Fugue in B flat minor (The Well-Tempered Clavier, Book 1) and Beethoven's String Quartet in A minor, opus 132 -- The portrayal of reflective life in action in painting : (...) discovery of the inner life of sensory perception in watercolours by Turner and oil paintings by Cézanne. (shrink)

Can thought arise out of matter? Can self, soul, consciousness, “I” arise out of mere matter? If it cannot, then how can you or I be here? I Am a Strange Loop argues that the key to understanding selves and consciousness is the “strange loop”—a special kind of abstract feedback loop inhabiting our brains. The most central and complex symbol in your brain is the one called “I.” The “I” is the nexus in our brain, one of many symbols seeming (...) to have free will and to have gained the paradoxical ability to push particles around, rather than the reverse. How can a mysterious abstraction be real—or is our “I” merely a convenient fiction? Does an “I” exert genuine power over the particles in our brain, or is it helplessly pushed around by the laws of physics? These are the mysteries tackled in I Am a Strange Loop, Douglas Hofstadter's first book-length journey into philosophy since Gödel, Escher, Bach. Compulsively readable and endlessly thought-provoking, this is a moving and profound inquiry into the nature of mind. (shrink)

The translator has collected passages from the varied corpus of Schweitzer's writing and has pieced them together into a brief but impressive sketch of the man and the thinker. Some sections are autobiographical; others contain Schweitzer's thoughts on Africa, world peace, on Goethe and Bach among historical figures, and a few of his basic philosophical ideas. An index provides references to the original works.--R. H. K.

Untersuchungen zur transtextuellen Poetik assyrischer herrschaftlich-narrativer Texte. By Johannes Bach. State Archives of Assyria Studies, vol. 30. Helsinki: the Neo-Assyrian Texxt Corpus Project, 2020. Pp. xvi + 481. $75 (paper). [Distributed by Penn State University Press, State Col- lege, PA].

There are many mean and nasty things to say about mean and nasty talk, but I don't plan on saying any of them. There's a specific problem about slurring words that I want to address. This is a semantic problem. It's not very important compared to the real-world problems presented by bigotry, racism, discrimination, and worse. It's important only to linguistics and the philosophy of language.

Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some (...) new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology. (shrink)

Once upon a time it was assumed that speaking literally and directly is the norm and that speaking nonliterally or indirectly is the exception. The assumption was that normally what a speaker means can be read off of the meaning of the sentence he utters, and that departures from this, if not uncommon, are at least easily distinguished from normal utterances and explainable along Gricean lines. The departures were thought to be limited to obvious cases like figurative speech and conversational (...) implicature. However, people have come to appreciate that the meaning of a typical sentence, at least one we are at all likely to use, is impoverished, at least relative to what we are likely to mean in uttering it. In other words, what a speaker normally means in uttering a sentence, even without speaking figuratively or obliquely, is an enriched version of what could be predicted from the meaning of the sentence alone. This can be because the sentence expresses a “minimal” (or “skeletal”) proposition or even because it fails to express a complete proposition at all.1 Indeed, it is now a platitude that linguistic meaning generally underdetermines speaker meaning. That is, generally what a speaker means in uttering a sentence, even if the sentence is devoid of ambiguity, vagueness, or indexicality, goes beyond what the sentence means. The question is what to make of this Contextualist Platitude, as I’ll call it. It may be a truism, but does it require a radical revision of the older conception of the relation between what sentences mean and what speakers mean in uttering them? Does it lead to a major modification, or perhaps even outright rejection, of the semantic-pragmatic distinction? I think.. (shrink)

Розкрито сутність поняття «рейтинг». Доведено значущість рейтингової оцінки для суб’єктів фінансового ринку, зокрема для страхових компаній, потенційних страхувальників, інвесторів та кредиторів.

This paper addresses the ongoing debate over the relation between belief and credence. A proposal is made to reverse the currently predominant order of analysis, by taking belief as conceptually basic and credence as the phenomenon to be clarified. In brief, the proposal is to explicate an agent’s credence in a proposition P as the agent’s tendency toward believing P. Platitudinous as this reduction may seem, it runs counter to all of the major positions in the debate, including the Threshold (...) View, the Certainty View as conventionally understood, Dualism, Eliminativism, as well as Credence Primitivism. Section 1 gives an overview on the current state of the debate. Section 2 considers unsuccessful predecessors of the proposed belief-first approach to credence. Section 3 motivates and lays out the basics of a conceptual framework for thinking about doxastic states that characterizes such states in terms of two formally independent dimensions, one pertaining to the agent’s tendency toward believing P, the other to the level of resilience with which the agent manifests that tendency. Against this backdrop, it is argued in Sect. 4 that the present reduction satisfies a set of standard, theoretically neutral criteria of adequacy for theories of credence, at least once they are purged of a quite common conflation of tendency and resilience. Section 5 argues against all of the above competing accounts. (shrink)